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We examined the relation between corporate performance and executive 
compensation of converted and mutual building societies and determinants of 
compensation over the period. Several findings emerge. First, average compensation 
of chief executives of converted building societies increased three folds in seven years 
while their counter parts in mutual societies benefited only by a modest increase. 
Second, whilst there is no significant difference in the performance of these two 
groups, the executives of converted societies received significantly higher 
compensation. Their total benefit increased significantly after the conversion. Third, 
the study confirms a significant difference in the determinant of compensation in 
converted and mutual societies. Finally, neither the corporate performance nor the 
size explains the compensation received by the executives of converted societies. 
However, a positive relation between corporate performance and executives’ 
compensation is observed in the cases of remaining mutual building societies. 
Overall, the possibility that the flotation of the mutual societies was inspired by the 
private interests of executives cannot be ruled out. 
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The demutualization process involves considerable time and resources of the firms 
going public.1  In spite of this, most of the large building societies that were owned by 
members, rather than shareholders, in the UK have changed their mutual status to 
publicly listed companies (plc). Shareholders’ (i.e. owners’) wealth maximising 
managers venture into such costly reorganisation process only if the anticipated gains 
from plc status outweigh the costs of conversion. However, due to agency reasons, it 
is also possible that the executives entrusted with managing the firm opt to go public 
only to enhance their own (managerial) private benefits. This alternative scenario is 
particularly possible in the context of building society conversion because the 
compensation to the senior executives of building societies in the UK have been 
perceived to be lower than the compensation received by comparable executives of 
publicly listed firms in banking industry. Although, such differences in compensation 
packages are usually attributed to the differences in corporate performance and 
agency relation a number of studies (for example, Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), 
Garvey and Milbourn (2003)) demonstrate that principle-agent model explains 
differences in executive compensation across firms. Therefore, it is important to 
understand who gained from conversions – owners, executives or both. 
 
Following the conversion of Abbey National in 1989, ten building societies converted 
to public limited companies from mutual ownership. Whilst the major beneficiaries 
are expected to be the members (shareholders), these conversions are generally 
considered to have benefited the executives of the converted societies. For example, it 
has been claimed that the chief executive of the Cheltenham and Gloucester building 
society received share options worth £1.4 million when the Lloyds bank acquired the 
society (Financial Times, February 21, 1995). Similarly, Barnes and Ward (1999) 
report that the annual cost of Abbey National’s directors increased from £1,164,000 in 
1989 to £2,371,000 in 1995. The directors of Abbey National also profited 
considerably from share options on conversion. In the context of increasing concerns 
                                                 
1 For example, the Halifax Building Society spent £153 million (equivalent to 27 per cent of post-tax 
profit) to go public from mutual society. 
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in both media and academic literature as to the increase in executive pay of converted 
building societies in the UK, this paper examines the relationship between the firm 
performance and CEO compensation (managerial private benefits). Central to these 
concerns have been the size of increase in the remuneration of CEOs (including share 
options). However, it is also possible that such increase in compensation was matched 
by improved firm performance. 
 
Mutual organisations do not issue shares and hence their executives cannot receive 
share options. However, they may receive comparable compensation in other forms, 
for example, cash or enhanced salary or bonuses or some combination. It could also 
be argued that the compensation package offered is a function of efficiency and the 
performance of the CEOs. Therefore, it is possible that prior to the conversion the 
building societies had low performing managers who lacked sufficient skills while 
after the conversion high quality managers are appointed with higher compensation. 
Although, in reality only a handful of managers were changed and most of them were 
promoted internally. More objectively, if the observed increase in managerial 
compensation is due to the improvement in managerial quality then the performance 
of such firms should improve. To examine these issues we compare the relative 
performance and remuneration of mutual firms and converted societies (now banks) 
to assess the significance of the form of ownership in determining the remuneration 
package of CEOs. We also analyse the determinants of CEOs compensation for both 
mutual and converted building societies. Overall, examinations of these issues help in 
assessing whether the conversion was guided by the private interest of the senior 
executives or by the shareholders’ wealth maximisation motive of the managers or a 
combination of both. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, a brief review of different 
theories and empirical evidence of executive compensation is provided. Sample and 
model specifications are described in section 3. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results of the study and section 5 concludes the paper. 
II. Theories of Managerial Compensation 
 
Issues on managerial private interest, executive compensation and corporate 
performance have received considerable attention of academics and practitioners alike 
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in the recent past. Prior studies have identified many factors that are thought to be 
critical in determining executive compensation. In this section we summarise the 
major theories that are pertinent to the research objective identified in previous 
section of this study and develop testable propositions. 
 
2.1 Corporate growth hypothesis: 
Corporate growth approach (i.e. growth in size measured by either sales or assets) 
suggests that the size of the firms not the profitability has a significant effect on 
executive compensation. Literature has generally supported the corporate growth 
approach for the determination of executive compensation. For example, early 
managerial theorists (see Cosh (1975), found that company size determines the 
executives’ compensation while Meek and Whittington (1975), document that growth 
pays no better than profitability. These two early studies of executive compensation 
generally support a positive association between compensation and size of the firm 
and growth of firm and compensation but not between compensation and profit. 
However, later studies included other potential variables, in addition to size, in the 
determinants of remuneration. For instance, Gregg et al (1993) investigated the 
relationship between the remuneration of the highest paid director and the economic 
performance over the 1980s and early 1990s and reported evidence of disappearing 
relationship between directors’ pay and corporate performance. They concluded that 
corporate growth is an important determinant of the change in directors’ 
remuneration. Ingham and Thompson (1995) examined the effects of size, growth, 
performance, and CEOs’ age on managerial compensation and reported a weak 
association between the changes in performance and managerial compensation. They 
further note that growth is more influential than profit in determining the managerial 
compensation. Bliss and Rosen (2001) examined the effect of bank mergers on 
executive compensation and posit a link between firm size and CEO compensation 
and conclude that growth through any means is good for executive compensation. 
Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman (1997) report that CEO compensation is positively 
associated with firm size. Conyon (1998) reports that the link between company size 
and executives’ compensation appears more robust than the association between pay 
and performance. Overall, the above discussion suggests testable propositions that: (a) 
“there is a positive relationship between size of firm and compensation”.  
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2.2 Agency theory hypothesis:   
In literature most attention on executive compensation has received from the 
perspective of agency theory.  In agency theory, owners (shareholders) and the agents 
(managers) of the firm are different and they have conflicting interest. The principal-
agent model of executive compensation suggests that by tying the pay of executives to 
firm performance such conflicting interest could be mitigated. Consequently, agency 
theory assumes that executive compensation will be positively related to firm 
performance. Despite the theoretical benefits much empirical evidence (see Gomez-
Meija and Wiseman 1997 and Jensen and Murphy 1990) has found a weak link 
between compensation and firm performance.  
 
Similarly Ogden and Watson (1996) examined the association between executive 
compensation and corporate performance after the privatisation of 10 water 
companies in England and Wales. They found that level of pay was driven by firm 
size and it has increased over the period of time. Firm performances were of minor 
importance in explaining the changes in the executives’ pay. Wolfram (1998) also 
reports similar findings after examining the compensation received by the executives 
of 12 regional electricity distribution companies in the UK. Thus, a testable 
proposition emerges: “there is a positive relationship between firm performance and 
the level of executive compensation”.  
 
2.3 Ownership structure hypothesis:  
It is also argued that form of ownership is important in the determination of executive 
pay. It will affect the ability and incentives of owners (shareholders) to monitor the 
manager. However, the findings are mixed. For example, Conyon and Leech (1994) 
have addressed the issue of company performance and ownership structure on 
remuneration. They report that corporate governance and ownership structure and 
control are not important in explaining the growth in top director pay in the mid 
1980s.  They found no evidence that the level of ownership concentration affects the 
growth in top director pay in their study period. However, Gomez-Mejia et al. (1997) 
report that firm’s ownership structure significantly affects the pay of CEOs. They also 
posit that when there are dominant stockholders’, CEO’s compensation levels reflect 
their firm’s performance and they are paid more for performance. They found this for 
both level and rate of change over time. Agarwal and Mandelkar (1990) examined 
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two competitive hypothesis, ‘the active monitoring hypothesis’ and ‘passive voting 
hypothesis’ and report that the existence of large shareholders leads to better 
monitoring managers. Their results support the ‘active monitoring hypothesis’. They 
concluded that, as proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) that the existence of large 
block holders leads to a better monitoring of the managers.  
 
Following the ownership structure theory on determination of executive pay, it may 
be expected that mutual firms have less incentives or ability to monitor the managers’ 
behaviour. Consequently, the link between firm performance and executive pay 
should be weaker for mutua l forms and stronger for plc forms of ownership. We 
expect positive relationship between firm performance and level of compensation 
especially after conversion.  
 
2.4 Social comparison hypothesis:  
Social comparison theory, proposed by Festinger (1954), suggests that the executives’ 
compensation is linked with the levels of compensation provided to other comparable 
firms. Generally, remuneration committees or other consulting firms determine the 
executive pay with reference to pay levels of similar type or size of the firm. Ezzamel 
and Watson (1996) argue that consultants base their recommendations on comparison 
with external market compensation and that may contribute to an increase in 
executive compensation. Executive pay is thus, not to be associated with factors such 
as performance, rather related to industry type and the size of the firm. 
 
III. The Sample and Model Specification 
 
3.1 Data: 
In modern history of British financial system, the demutualization of mutual building 
societies started in 1989. Since then ten mutually owned building societies have been 
converted into limited liability companies in the UK. These companies cover more 
than 80 per cent of the total industry assets. In 1997 alone, five of the larger building 
societies (Alliance and Leicester, Halifax, Northern Rock, Bristol and West, and 
Woolwich), with more than 60 per cent of total industry assets, went public. This 
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study analyses the cases of four of these societies/banks.2 Of the ten demutualized 
building societies, only six were independent conversions and the rest were either 
taken over by other institutions. National and provincial was acquired by Abbey 
National in 1995; Birmingham Midshires was taken over by Halifax in 1999. 
Similarly, Cheltenham and Gloucester was taken over by Lloyds TSB bank in 1995 
while Bristol and West was acquired by the Bank of Ireland in 1997. 
 
Our sample period covers 8 years between 1993 and 2000. We compare the CEO 
compensation packages of the sample demutualized firms (four) with that of 15 
mutual building societies (control firms). These control firms have assets worth more 
than one billion Pound Sterling and necessary data are available. The main sources of 
data are Annual Reports and financial accounts of the sample and control firms. CEO 
compensation package includes six components. These are: annual salary, annual 
bonus, medium term bonus, long term incentive plans (LTIPs), value of employee 
share options (ESOs), and other benefits such as health insurance, and contributions 
for cars. All monetary items are expressed at the price of 2000, adjusted by annual 
Retail Price Index. Additionally, if a CEO is appointed during a particular financial 
year and detailed information on their remuneration is not available, following the 
approach suggested by Wolfram (1998), his/her salary is prorated. 
 
Table 1 reveals that the average size (measured by total assets) of firms under analysis 
is £16,660 million while their sales revenue stands at £1,040 million per year per firm. 
It shows that every Pound Sterling invested in building societies’ assets generate sales 
worth 6.2 pence. These statistics confirm a need to control for firm size in an 
analytical model. Table 1 further show that the average rate of return on assets (ROA) 
is only 5.94%. Table 1 further shows that during the sample period total assets of 
these firms grew by 10.23%, and their profit increased by 13.30% while average 
compensation received by CEOs increased by 11.72% implying that the compensation 
received by CEOs is not far way from the growth in assets and profits of building 
societies. However, the distribution of these measures reveals a wide variation in the 
growth rates of asset, profit and CEO compensation suggesting a further need to 
                                                 
2 Bristol and West Building Society was taken over by a foreign bank and hence excluded from the 
analysis. 
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analyse whether these measures differ significantly between mutual and demutualized 
firms. We examine this issue in the next section. 
 
3.2 Valuation of Executive incentive plans: 
Two of the major components of executive compensation package are performance 
shares i.e. long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) and employee share options. Unlike 
other components of compensation they are not directly measurable. Performance 
share plan (LTIPs) is valued using equation (1): 
 
(1)  Value = price * shares *target * (1/ ((1 + r + f) z)) 
 
Where, price represents the price at which shares/units were granted, shares is the 
numbers of shares/unit granted, target is the target payout expressed as portion of a 
share granted, r represents risk free rate of interest, f  is the forfeiture risk and z is the 
length of performance period. This method is broadly similar to Westphal and Zajac 
(1994).  
 
Data on price, performance shares granted and length of performance period are 
collected from annual reports and accounts.  Risk free interest rate used in valuation is 
UK government gilt rate matching to the performance period of the shares granted. 
The forfeiture risk is 3% as suggested by Towers Perrin, UK. Most of the firms grant 
the performance shares relative to the total shareholders return (TSR) of a comparator 
peer group. Where such peer groups’ information is available, we used %ile % 
ranking in comparator group. If such information is not available, we used 50%. This 
is the similar method used by consulting firm Towers Perrin, UK.3 
 
The value of employee share option is estimated using a model first introduced by 
Noreen and Wolfson (1981) for the valuation of executive stock options. The model is 
based on the Black-Scholes’ option-pricing model. 4 Like the Black-Scholes option 
pricing model it takes stock price, exercise price, risk-free interest rate, expected life 
of option, volatility, and dividend yield into account. We obtain stock prices from 
Hydra Data base and exercise prices from annual reports and accounts of sample 
                                                 
3 The method was made available to the author by Towers Perrin. 
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companies. Risk free interest rate is the UK government’s gilt rate matching the life 
of option. Expected life of the option is measured by the maximum period of option in 
which it can be exercised. Dividend yield is the expected annual dividend to be paid 
during the life of the option divided by the average market price of the stock. Finally, 
volatility is measured as the standard deviation (annual) of a stock’s returns.  
 
3.3 The models: 
As stated earlier, the primary aim of this paper to examine whether the 
demutualization of building societies was guided by the managers’ private interest or 
their endeavour in enhancing the shareholders’ (members’) wealth. In achieving this 
objective, we address two issues. First, we compare the compensation packages 
received by the executives of the demutualized societies before and after the event. 
We also compare the compensation received by the executives of demutualized firms 
with those of continuing mutual (control) firms. We test for the significance of 
difference in compensation packages using parametric (T-statistic) test. A significant 
difference would suggest either the demutualization was guided by the private interest 
of the executives or the performance of the firms has increased substantially to justify 
the increased compensation. Therefore, such results would warrant an evaluation of 
firm performance. 
 
Second, it has been recognised that the remuneration package of executives is 
determined by a complex interaction of several firm specific and market-wide factors 
but univariate tests discussed above cannot control for such complex interaction. 
Presence of such complexity is recognised by the wide array of variables employed by 
studies dedicated in investigating the determinants of executive pay (see Gomez-
Majia and Wiseman 1997 for a review of such studies). Based on the variables 
employed, the studies on executive compensation could be grouped into two 
categories viz. accounting and market performance. However, there is no consensus 
on which approach is more appropriate in explaining the cross-sectional as well as 
time series variation in the levels (and changes) of executive compensation. This 
study examines the association between accounting ratios and executive 
compensation. This selection is guided by the nature of our sample. Prior to 
                                                                                                                                            
4 See, Noreen and Wolfson (1981) for the stock option valuation model. Crawford et al (1997) provide 
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demutualization (the event under analysis) the firms were owned by members, shares 
were not issued, and hence their pre-demutualization market price is not available. 
Moreover, the control firms we use are still mutually owned. Therefore, market 
performance measures cannot be applied. The accounting performance measures we 
use include return on assets, asset growth, and profit growth. The literature also 
documents an association between executive pay and firm size (see, for instance, 
Ciscell and Carroll, 1980 and Wolfram, 1998). To account for the size effect we 
include firm size (total assets) as a ‘control’ variable in the model. We also control for 
the influence of time. Equation (2) is estimated to examine the relation between 
compensation and performance. 
 
3 7
, 0 1 , , ,
1 1
(2) ln( ) ln( ) ( )j t j t k k j t t y jt
k y
Com FS Perk Yeara a b g e
= =
= + + + +å å  
 
Where ln(Com) is the natural log of total compensation received by the chief 
executive of company j (j = 4 for converting societies; and j=15 for mutual building 
societies) in year t (t = 8 for 1993-2000). ln (FS) stands for natural log of firm size 
measured by total assets. Perk the vector of performance measurement represents 
three (i.e. k=3) accounting measures of firm performance (return on assets, assets 
growth, and profit growth). ‘Year’ is the year specific (0, 1) dummy variable and ejt is 
error term.  
 
We estimate equation (2) on panel data. We also estimate equation (2) for various 
components of executive compensation. In order to examine the possible implications 
of demutualization on the determinants of compensation we estimate the equation for 
three different sample (sub-sample) periods for both demutualized and continuing 
building societies separately. The sample/sub-sample periods are (a) the overall 
sample period (1993-2000), (b) the pre-demutualization period (1993-1996), and (c) 




                                                                                                                                            
a spreadsheet macro to estimate the model. 
 10 
IV.  The Results 
 
4.1 CEO compensation: 
As noted earlier although the average compensation received by CEOs is not different 
from average growth in assets and profitability of the sample firms their dispersions 
are very high. Estimates in table  2 (panel A) show that average compensation of the 
CEOs of demutualized building societies has always been significantly higher than 
the compensation received by the CEOs of other building societies. For example, 
average compensation of the CEOs of demutua lized societies in 1993 was £296,540 
while it was £172,360 for mutual building societies. In 2000, the executives of 
demutualized firms received £1,166,250 (including the value of share option and 
performance share plans) in compensation while the CEOs of mutual building 
societies received only £284,600. This shows that during the 7 year period the 
remuneration of CEOs of demutualized firms increased by 293% while the CEOs of 
mutual societies benefited by 65% only. We also analyse the differences in 
compensation of converted and mutual societies before and after demutualization. The 
table reveals that before demutualization (1993-1996) difference in the compensation 
of the CEOs of converted and continuing mutual societies was 94% but it reached to 
232% after demutualization (1997-2000). The differences are statistically significant 
for each year in the sample. Overall, although the compensation received by the CEOs 
of converted societies has always been higher than that received by the CEOs of 
continuing mutual societies, the gap has been increased over the years, especially after 
the flotation (see Figure 1). 
  
Panel B provides details of average remuneration of CEOs of both converted and 
mutual societies by its components. The table shows that both salaries and bonuses of 
converted societies are higher than that of mutual building societies. However, the 
difference in the compensation of CEOs has increased substantially after the 
conversion even without including value of the shares and options. This confirms that 
incentive payment is significantly different between converted and remaining building 
societies. Before conversion, the CEOs of converted societies were receiving 21% of 
their compensation in the forms of incentives (such as bonuses) but after the 
conversion this ratio increased to 46%. During the same period the share of incentives 
in total compensation received by the CEOs of other mutual societies’ increased from 
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6% to 17%. Overall, the estimates recorded in table 2 establish the fact that the CEOs 
of converted building societies have been receiving more remuneration than the CEOs 
of mutual societies and the gap is widening rapidly, especially after demutualization.  
 
4.2 Corporate performance vs. CEO compensation: 
The discussion above confirms that the compensation package enjoyed by the 
executives of the converted building societies is significantly higher than that of 
mutual building societies. Moreover, their compensation has increased significantly 
after the conversion. This implies that the conversion was guided by the private 
interests of the executives. However, it is possible that such higher and increased 
compensation is associated with their performance. For example, above discussion 
clearly showed that incentive payment (payment linked to performance of the firm) to 
the CEOs of converted societies has increased from one fifth of total compensation to 
nearly half of the total compensation in the form of incentive payment. We address 
this issue in this section. 
 
Table 3 provides a comparative picture of corporate performance and compensation 
between converted and mutual building societies before and after the flotation.  The 
estimates show that total assets and sales of both converted and mutual building 
societies have increased significantly after the event. However, the rate of return on 
assets (ROA) and growth rate of total assets of converted building societies did not 
change significantly. However, ROA of mutual societies declined significantly but the 
rate of their asset growth increased significantly. The changes in profit growth remain 
insignificant for both groups of sample firms. The table further shows that the 
converted building societies are significantly larger (measured by total assets and 
sales) than mutual societies and the ROA of converted societies is significantly higher 
than that of their mutual counter parts. On the other hand, the difference in their asset 
growth and profit growth are not statistically significant. These statistics question the 
justification for higher compensation received by the CEOs of converted building 
societies. The change in performance is not in line with the increased compensation. 
We also compare the yearly performance of these groups of societies (table not 
reported) and find that, except in 1999, the ir performances do not differ significantly. 
Overall, the CEOs of converted societies are paid significantly higher compensation 
compared to remaining societies but they are not displaying better performance.  
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Overall, the comparative analysis (cross-sectional as well as before and after the 
conversion) shows that the executives of converted building societies are receiving 
significantly higher compensation than their mutual sector counterparts and their 
compensation has increased significantly after the conversion. On the other hand, no 
measure of performance reveals any significant improvement. These results do not 
support the notion of ‘higher compensation for better performance’. Therefore, this 
analysis suggests that the executives are the clear winners of the demutualization who 
benefited more than the member/shareholders of converted building societies. This 
implies possibly the conversion of mutual societies to plc was guided by the private 
interest of the executives. 
 
4.3 What determines CEOs’ compensation? 
Although the evidence from univariate analysis is revealing, such method fails to 
allow for the interaction between various factors that determine executive 
compensation. It also does not identify the factors that are responsible for deciding the 
compensation packages. To identify the determinants of compensation we estimate 
equation (2) in its various forms. The results are in table 4.  
 
The estimates for full sample period (column-1, table 4) reveal that total 
compensation (salary, bonuses, benefits, value of LTIPs and share options) received 
by the CEOs of these firms is a function of firm size. This supports the hypothesis of 
positive relationship between firm size and compensation as stated in earlier pages. 
However, it is not related to any measure of performance i.e. the coefficients of 
growth in profit, growth in assets, and return on assets remain statistically 
insignificant. This does not support the notation of positive relationship between firm 
performance and executive compensation. This result is not surprising and is in line 
with studies on the privatisation of electricity and water industries in the UK. For 
example, Wolfram (1998) report that the salary increase awarded to the CEOs of 12 
regional electric companies after privatisation did not correspond with the size of the 
companies and that largest changes in the executive salaries occurred over time. 
Similarly, Ogden and Watson (1996) examined the executive pay and relative 
corporate performance of 10 privatised water companies of England and document 
evidence that salary level increased significantly over time independent of any 
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changes in firm size or performance within the water industry5.  The estimate also 
reveal a significant positive impact of dummy variable that represents the status of 
building societies (1 if the society is converted, 0 otherwise) indicating that the 
executives of converted firms are receiving significantly higher compensation. To 
control for possible structural shift in the relation between executive compensation 
and its explanatory variables we introduce year dummies in the model (column-2, 
table 4). The coefficients of all year dummies are significant and positive. Moreover, 
once the effect of time (year) has been controlled for, the impact of return on assets (a 
measure of corporate performance) on executive compensation becomes statistically 
significant. Its positive sign confirms that the increase in return on assets leads to 
increase in executive compensation. The effect of firm size remains significant 
confirming that the executives of larger firms receive higher remuneration. The 
coefficient of determination (adjusted R-squared) shows that this model can explain 
over 4/5th (82.6%) of variation in executive compensation. The table further reveals 
that there is no substantial change in the role of the determinants of compensation 
before and after the conversion (columns 3 to 6, table 4).  
 
To assess whether the determinants of the compensation of the CEOs of converted 
building societies and mutual societies differ and whether the relationship changed 
overtime, we reestimate equation (2) for each group of companies – converted and 
mutual. The estimates that are controlled for annual variation are presented in table 5. 
The results (column 1) reveal that total compensation of the CEOs of converted firms 
is not affected by any measure of corporate performance. Neither the size of the firm 
plays any significant role. This rejects the notion of pay for performance in the 
context of converted building societies. This is partly consistent with the findings of 
Ingham and Thompson (1993) that both performance measures (ROA and profit 
growth) have negative effect on compensation. It is also note worthy that the 
coefficients for time dummies for the year after conversion (1997 to 2000) are 
significant indicating that the conversion played an important role in determining the 
compensation of the CEOs of converted building societies. The possible reasons for 
the lack of relation between corporate performance and executive compensation 
                                                 
5 Wolfram (1998) reports 230 to 280 percent increase and Ogden and Watson (1996) report an increase 
of 156 percent after privatisation of electricity and water industries in the UK. Both of these measures 
exclude the value of share options. 
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include changes of chief executives around the time of demutualization. Indeed, two 
chief executives were changed around the time of demutualization6. However, these 
changes were not new faces for the companies; they were working as directors within 
the company. Overall, these estimates does not support pay for performance. On the 
contrary, the estimates (column 2) show that the compensation received by the 
executives of mutual building societies is positively and significantly affected by all 
three measures of corporate performance (profit growth, asset growth, and ROA) and 
the size of the company. The explanatory power of model is also very respectable 78 
per cent.  
 
The table further shows that prior to demutualization the compensation of the CEOs 
of converted societies was not affected by any factor but ROA (column 3). Contrary 
to general expectation it had negative effect on executive compensation. However, 
after the conversion the situation even got worse. Now the firm size, return on assets, 
and asset growth all are significantly inversely related to compensation (column 5). 
This reconfirms that the compensation received by the CEOs of converted building 
societies is increasing while the performance of the firms is declining. On the other 
hand, the compensation received by the executives of mutual societies has always 
been positively affected by some measures of corporate performance and the size of 
the firm (columns 4 and 6). Thus, the results in table 5 confirm a significant 
difference in the determinants of converted and mutual societies. The CEOs of 
converted societies are receiving significantly higher compensation and the principle 
of ‘pay for performance’ does not hold. 
V. Conclusions  
 
This paper examines the relation between corporate performance and executive 
compensation of converted and mutual building societies and determinants of 
compensation over the period. It also analyses the changes in the compensation 
package of the demutualized building societies and compares the compensation 
received by the CEOs of converted societies with that of remaining mutual building 
societies. Several findings emerge. First, on average total compensation of chief 
executives of converted building societies increased three folds in seven years (1993 
to 2000) while their counter parts in remaining mutual building societies benefited by 
                                                 
6 Chief executives of Woolwich and Northern Rock were changed in 1996 and 1997 respectively. 
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an increase of 65%. Second, the executives of converted companies receive 
significantly higher compensation than the executives of remaining mutual building 
societies. Third, the overall benefit of the CEOs of converted firms increased 
significantly after the conversion. Fourth, the results confirm a significant difference 
in the determinants of compensation. Finally, neither any measure of corporate 
performance nor the size of the firm can explain the compensation received by the 
executives of converted societies. Contrary to the principle of ‘pay for performance’ 
some measures of corporate performance are inversely related to the compensation of 
the CEOs of converted firms. On the other hand, a positive relation between corporate 
performance and executives’ salary is observed in the cases of remaining mutual 
building societies. Thus, the possibility that the executives of converted building 
societies were motivated by their own private interest rather than the interest of the 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Summary statistics of the major variables used in the paper are presented. Total assets are measured for the group. Total sales are the total interest earned of a 
group. Return on assets is measured by earnings to total assets ratio; where earnings are defined as interest earned and other income after deducting 
management expenses but before interest payments, provisions to loan loss reserves and taxes. Asset growth is obtained by dividing the change in assets by 
previous year’s total assets. Profit growth is measured by the dividing the change in profit before tax by previous year’s growth in profit before tax. Total 
compensation includes salaries, bonuses, medium term bonuses, benefits and values of share options and long-term incentive plan (LTIPS). The sample 
covers 4 demutualized and 15 matching building societies for a period between 1993 and 2000. 
 




Minimum  Lower 
Quartile  
Median  Upper 
Quartile  
Maximum  Std deviation Mean /std 
deviation 
Total Assets £m 152 16660 634 1669.86 3676 17710.21 182520 31423.25 .530 
Total Sales £m 152 1040 48 115.26 239 964.11 9387 1831.11 .131 
Return on Assets (ROA) 152 5.94 4.24 5.40 5.95 6.49 7.65 .696 8.534 
Assets growth 152 10.23 -31.24 6.61 10.38 13.18 37.79 6.895 1.484 
Profit growth 152 13.30 -73.71 -2.54 9.27 24.57 341.46 37.559 .354 





Compensation of Chief Executives 
 
Panel A: Average Compensation for Chief Executives in Converted and Mutual Building Societies 
Year CE from a Converted 
Building Society with 
Options and LTIPS (£‘000) 
CE from a Converted 
Building Society without 
Options and LTIPS (£‘000) 
CE from a Mutual 
Building Society 
(£‘000) 
T-test difference in 
mean (column 1x3) 
T-test difference in 
mean (column 2x3) 














































































*, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. + Following Levene tests inequality in variance is assumed.  
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Panel B: Components of CEO Compensation: 
 
Averages of various components of CEO compensation of converted and mutual building societies are presented. The salary is the fixed compensation 
provided to the chief executive officer. Bonus and medium bonus are performance related pay and awarded in the form of cash. For converted 
societies bonuses include medium bonuses (when paid). LTIPs and options are also performance related pay and awarded in the form of shares. 
 
 Converted Building Societies Mutual Building Societies 
Year/Components 1993-1996 1997-2000 1993-2000 1993-1996 1997-2000 1993-2000 
Salary (£000) 292.18 418.19 355.18 175.31 191.27 183.29 
Bonus (£000) 87.42 196.07 141.74 14.19 45.88 30.03 
Medium bonus N/A N/A N/A 3.78 8.63 6.21 
Benefits 5.92 19.36 12.64 4.98 13.41 9.20 
LTIPs (£000) N/A 84.75 42.38 N/A N/A N/A 
Options (£000) N/A 141.88 70.94 N/A N/A N/A 





Firm Characteristics of Converted and Matching Building Societies: A comparison 
 
For the definition of the variables please see table 1.  *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  + Following Levene tests inequality 
in variance is assumed. If this test is significant then the difference in the variances of two groups are significantly different and our sample do not meet the 
assumption of equal variance.  
 
 Year  Total Assets £m Total Sales £m ROA Assets growth Profit growth Total compensation 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
 Convert
ed 
Mutual Converted Mutual Converted Mutual Converted Mutual Converted Mutual Converted Mutual 
Mean 1993-96 43137 6127 2826 409 6.13 6.09 12.85 8.39 21.14 16.06 385.51 198.26 
Mean 1997-00 61473 8182 3625 506 6.12 5.68 9.88 11.45 12.17 8.74 860.25 259.19 
T test for mean 
differences 3.042
*** 3.167*** 3.028*** 3.352*** .017 3.313*** 1.233 2.664** 1.427 1.043 5.737***+ 3.158***+ 
Mean 1993-00 52305 7155 3226 457 6.12 5.89 11.37 9.92 16.66 12.40 622.88 228.73 
T test for mean 
differences 5.064***+ 5.712***+ 1.717* .895+ .569 6.593***+ 
 
 22 
Table 4  
Factors Affecting Executives’ Compensation of Converted and Continuing Building Societies 
 
 
See table 1 for the definitions of the variables. Society status is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 
converted building societies and 0 for continuing building Societies. The dependent variable (Com) is the log 
of the total compensation (salary, bonuses, benefits, value of LTIPs and ESOs) received by the CEOs. The 
coefficients are obtained from equation (2).  *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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152 152 76 76 76 76 
Adjusted R2 .749 .826 .760 .802 .852 .862 
F - stat 91.018 60.665 48.589 38.976 87.078 59.372 
D-W stat. 1.695 2.010 2.152 2.095 2.111 2.173 
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Table 5 
Comparison of Determinants of executives’ Compensation before and after Demutualization 
 
See table 1 for the definitions of the variables. The dependent variable (Com) is the log of the total 
compensation (salary, bonuses, benefits, value of LTIPs and ESOs) received by the CEOs. The 
coefficients are obtained from equation (2).  T-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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32 120 16 60 16 60 
Adjusted R2 0.706 0.780 0.575 0.705 0.496 .808 
F-stat 7.777 39.363 3.897 21.172 3.105 36.371 
D-W stat 2.093 2.233 1.861 1.899 1.976 2.430 
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Figure 1
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